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BEYOND THE CITY SQUARE: FISHING IN
WIDER POOLS WITHOUT SOUNDINGS
Monica A. Fennell∗Φ
A Response to Judith L. Maute, English
Reforms to Judicial Selection: Comparative Lessons
for American States?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 387
(2007).
I would like to open up a conversation in
CITY SQUARE about diversity in the judicial
appointment process in the United Kingdom and the
United States, a conversation sparked by Professor
Judith Maute’s article English Reforms to Judicial
Selection:
Comparative
Lessons
for
American
States?1 The previous process for appointment to
the bench in the United Kingdom was one of what
Professor
Maute
calls
“‘secret
soundings’——a
process of anonymous consultation with unnamed
sitting judges.”2 Professor Maute explains:
Once it was done in smoke-filled rooms of
gentlemen’s
clubs
or
in
the
Temple
corridors.
Lawyers were appointed to be
judges after the right word in the ear;
they were “tapped on the shoulder” and
asked if they fancied promotion to the
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Suggested citation: Monica A. Fennell, Beyond the City
Square: Fishing in Wider Pools Without Soundings, 39 F ORDHAM
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402.
1. Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to Judicial Selection:
Comparative Lessons for American States?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
387 (2007).
2. Id. at 389.
Φ
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Bench. Whom you knew counted; as did your
college or school.3

Lady Brenda Hale, the first female Law Lord and
now the only woman on the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom,4 has affirmed that under the
previous appointment process there was “no such
thing
as
an
applications
process. . . .
No
application
forms,
no
CVs,
nothing . . .
transparent like that.”5
Professor Maute states in her article that
the British judiciary was almost exclusively
comprised of “older white males” and had a
“stunning homogeneity.”6
Cambridge law professor
Neil
Andrews
labels
this
homogeneity
as
extraordinary, saying, “judges were virtually
cloned.”7
Moreover, Professor Maute notes that
although the judicial selection process in the
United
Kingdom
has
not
been
fraught
with
partisanship as in the United States, the
“American courts are light years ahead of British
courts
in
terms
of
demographic
representativeness.”8
Professor
Andrews
urges
that, “[a] wider pool of talent exists.
Those
waters should be fished.”9

3. Id. at 396.
4. See Sally J. Kenney, Britain Appoints First Woman Law
Lord, 87 JUDICATURE 189, 189-90 (2004); see also Maute, supra
note 1, at 408.
5. Webcast——Justice Ginsburg and Baroness Hale——The British
and United States Legal Systems, GEORGETOWN UNIV. L AW CENTER (Jan.
24, 2008), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.
cfm?eventID=473; see also Monica A. Fennell, Emergent
Identity: A Comparative Analysis of the New Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the United
States, 22 T EMP. I NT ’L & C OMP. L.J. 279, 283 (2008).
6. Maute, supra note 1, at 389, 406; see also Diversity,
DEP ’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, http://www.dca.gov.uk/judges/
diversity.htm (last modified Jan. 17, 2009).
7. Neil Andrews, The United Kingdom’s Supreme Court: Three
Skeptical Reflections Concerning the New Court, 2011 U TAH L.
REV . 9, 21 (2011).
8. Maute, supra note 1, at 392.
9. Andrews, supra note 7, at 24.
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Maute outlines a new, more transparent and
open process for the appointment of judges in the
United Kingdom.
Created by the Constitutional
Reform Act of 2005,10 this new judicial appointment
process
was
designed,
in
part,
to
improve
diversity and representativeness on the bench.11
These reforms also moved the United Kingdom’s
highest court out of Parliament and renamed it the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which may
give the U.K. Supreme Court a more recognizable
but still more muted identity than the U.S.
Supreme Court.12
10. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, pt. 4, § 64
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2005/4/section/64.
11. See Mary L. Clark, Advice and Consent vs. Silence and
Dissent?
The Contrasting Roles of the Legislature in U.S.
and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA . L. REV. 451, 484 (2011)
(“With their emphasis on merit rather than on whom a
candidate knew, the appointment commissions were thought to
offer potential for achieving greater diversity as well as
competence, where ‘merit’ was no longer to be understood in
narrowly constrained, tradition-bound ways.”); Peter L.
Fitzgerald, Constitutional Crisis over the Proposed Supreme
Court for the United Kingdom, 18 TEMP. I NT’L & COMP . L.J. 233,
233 (2004); see also Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court
for the United Kingdom, D EP ’T. FOR C ONSTITUTIONAL A FFAIRS, 4, 32
(July
2003),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/supreme.pdf.
12. See Fennell, supra note 5, at 305
(“[T]he
new
appointment process prioritizes diversity in the judges and
thereby places more emphasis on the personal identity of
individual
Justices.
Nonetheless,
without
U.S.-style
legislative hearings in the appointment process, the U.K.
Supreme Court Justices will not become as identifiable as the
U.S. Supreme Court Justices. The reduction of the judicial
responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor and the placement of
the President of the U.K. Supreme Court at the head of the
judiciary provides an opportunity for the President of the
U.K. Supreme Court to shape a collective court identity——just
as Chief Justice Roberts is shaping his Court.
The U.K.
Supreme Court’s identity as a whole will nonetheless be more
elusive than U.S. Supreme Court identity because the court
will sit in panels and not en banc like the U.S. Supreme
Court. . . . Although the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy
has diffused the sense of identity for the United Kingdom’s
highest court, the doctrine of judicial review——which would
tend to strengthen court identity——is gaining some ground
with the new constitutional reforms.”).
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Professor Maute predicts that this new
judicial appointment system in the United Kingdom
will be successful in, among other things,
increasing diversity on the bench, and she urges
the United States to look to this model. It may
be too early to evaluate for most of the
judiciary, but so far, the new procedures for
appointment to the U.K. Supreme Court have not
resulted in greater diversity. Lady Hale asserted
in an interview that she is “quite embarrassed to
be the only Justice to tick a lot of the diversity
boxes.”13
The current composition of the U.K.
Supreme Court is all white, and eleven of twelve
are male.14
As for the rest of the judiciary,
Professor Maute already found, even a few years
ago, a “significant increase in the proportion of
women and minority lawyers taking silk,” a
potential stepping stone to the judiciary.15
Professor Maute suggests that more can be
done to gain diversity on the bench and that
“diversity
and
merit
are
not
opposed
but
16
complementary aims.”
Professor Maute questions
“numerical nosecounts,”17 yet does not fully
address how progress should be measured. The U.K.
judiciary has already begun to evaluate the
effectiveness of the new judicial selection
processes in increasing diversity.
The U.K.
13. Dan Tench & Laura Coogan, An exclusive interview with
Lady Hale, UKSC BLOG (Sept. 16, 2010), http://ukscblog.com/an
-exclusive-interview-with-lady-hale.
14. See Biographies of the Justices, T HE S UPREME C OURT (last
visited Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/
biographies.html; see also Clark, supra note 11, at 484
n.167.
15. Maute, supra note 1, at 401.
16. See id. at 409 (internal quotations omitted); see also
Tench & Coogan, supra note 13 (“But given that very able
women do, for a variety of reasons, become less visible than
men in their legal careers, the judicial appointments system
should be asking how to select the ones who have really good
judicial potential, even though they haven’t reached the
point in their professional careers at which they would in
the past have been regarded as ready for judicial office.”).
17. Maute, supra note 1, at 393.
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Supreme Court’s equality and diversity strategy
defines diversity as:
people who are in one or more of seven
diversity groups; race, gender identity,
disability, age, religion or belief or
sexual orientation.
For staff, we mean
diversity in its widest sense, encompassing
people
who
work
part-time
or
other
alternative working patterns; people with
different
skills,
experiences
and
educational and social backgrounds; and
people with caring responsibilities.18

Benchmarks have been established and progress
measured
against
the
recommendations
for
increasing diversity from the Advisory Panel on
Judicial Diversity.19 I would like to open up for
discussion whether the recent Report of the
Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity provides a
meaningful way to measure progress in the United
Kingdom or even in the United States.
How can
progress be gauged without “nosecounts?”
Maute posits that “[h]onest reflection on any
form of judicial selection must acknowledge that
political, professional, and social connections
influence both process and outcome.”20
Professor
Maute cites a work from 1989 as foundational, but
it is not clear that this point is settled in the
courts and outside of academia.
For example, in
looking at early announcement of the panel of
judges in U.S. appellate courts, a study states
that “[t]here is a strong predisposition in the
American legal system toward the formalist notion
that
judges
perform
their
function
without
18. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom Equality and
Diversity
Strategy
2010-2012,
T HE
S UPREME
C OURT
2,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/equality_diversity_strate
gy.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
19. See M INISTRY OF J USTICE, I MPROVING JUDICIAL D IVERSITY: P ROGRESS
TOWARDS DELIVERY OF THE ‘REPORT OF THE A DVISORY P ANEL ON JUDICIAL DIVERSITY
2010,’ at 3-4 (May 9, 2011), http://www.justice.gov.uk/
downloads/publications/policy/moj/judicial-diversity-report2010.pdf.
20. Maute, supra note 1, at 412-13.

16

FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE

[Vol. 39:11

recourse to personal ideology or past experience,”
but also notes that this notion has come under
attack and that “judicial characteristics matter
to legal outcomes.”21
Professor Maute recognizes
that to
suggest that individual judges can, or
should be expected to, best empathize and
reflect the viewpoints of the demographic
group from which they come is unwarranted
and
grossly
essentialist. . . .
Nevertheless, it is now generally accepted
that judges do not decide cases in legal
vacuums and that their judicial performance
is
influenced
by
a
contextualized
understanding
about
society,
including
issues of class, gender, society, and life
experiences.22

Professor Maute also concludes that, “[t]o restore
public confidence in the courts, people must
believe that judges exercise legitimate authority,
undistorted by personal or partisan preferences.”23
How does this statement impact the “personal is
political” argument made earlier in Professor
Maute’s article?
Professor
Maute
asserts
that
the
U.S.
judiciary can learn much from Britain’s judicial
selection process and from using more modern
personnel practices.24 This is echoed by Professor
Terence Lau, who points to the new U.K. judicial
selection process as “a useful template.”25
This

21. Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement,
and Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 55, 63, 66 (2007); see also
Fennell, supra note 5, at 292.
22. Maute, supra note 1, at 406.
Cf. Jeffrey Toobin, T HE
NINE:
I NSIDE THE S ECRET W ORLD OF THE SUPREME C OURT 338 (2007)
(maintaining, inter alia, that the days of having a Catholic
seat and a Jewish seat on the U.S. Supreme Court are over).
23. Maute, supra note 1, at 423.
24. See id.
25. Terence J. Lau, Judicial Independence: A Call for
Reform, 9 NEV. L.J. 79, 80 (2008).
Professor Lau suggests
creating an independent judicial appointment body and notes
that many states “have adopted some variant of the so-called
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leads me to my final question for discussion on
CITY SQUARE. What are the U.K. judiciary’s modern
personnel practices that Professor Maute lauds and
how can they increase diversity on the bench in
the United States?

‘Missouri plan,’ providing for nonpartisan selection
judges by independent commissions.” Id. at 126.
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